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(b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) [redacted]

COUNTRY: (U) ARGENTINA (AR)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: [redacted] COMMENTS ON ARGENTINA'S POL/
- MIL SITUATION THREE WEEKS PRIOR TO ELECTIONS;
- THOUGHT PIECE (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
- EVALUATED INTEL

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DOI: (U) 83 10 04

REQS: (U) [redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) [redacted] OPEN PRESS;
- CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF ARGENTINE
- SOCIETY/MILITARY

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ COMMENTS HEREIN ARE COLLECTION OF
- OBSERVATIONS [redacted] OVER PAST MONTH AS ARGENTINE
- NATION PREPARES FOR THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELEC-
- TIONS IN 10 YEARS. OBSERVATIONS SHOULD BE VIEWED
- AS [redacted] OPINIONS OR PERCEPTIONS AND IN NO WAY
- CONSTRUED AS AUTHORITATIVE.

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TEXT: (U) SEE SUMMARY.

COMMENTS: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE A SYNOPSIS OF RELATED OBSERVATIONS WHICH ARE INCLUDED IN A SINGLE REPORT TO GIVE READERSHIP AN INSIGHT INTO THE COMPLEXITY OF THE CURRENT ARGENTINE POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION AS IT IS VIEWED HERE IN BUENOS AIRES.

1. (U) U.S./ARGENTINE RELATIONS:

- A. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ OF ALL THE INTERNAL TURMOIL THAT HAS RESULTED HERE IN ARGENTINA SINCE THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT THERE IS ONE FACTOR THAT HAS REMAINED AN ISSUE AND CONTINUES TO GROW AS A NATIONAL PERCEPTION. THIS IS THE PERCEPTION THAT MANY (AND IN SOME MINDS, ALL) OF THE PROBLEMS EXTANT IN ARGENTINA TODAY HAVE THEIR ROOTS IN USG ACTIONS OR POLICY. GRANTED THAT IN THEIR EFFORTS TO RATIONALIZE THEIR CURRENT DILEMMA THE ARGENTINE, IN GENERAL, REFUSES TO ACCEPT ANY RESPONSIBILITY OR CULPABILITY FOR PAST ACTIONS. ALTHOUGH LOOKING INTO ARGENTINA FROM THE OUTSIDE WE IN THE U.S. CAN SEE AS FOOLISH AND EVEN CHILDISH, BUT TO THE AVERAGE ARGENTINE CITIZEN, THESE PERCEPTIONS AND THOUGHTS ARE VERY REAL AND VIRTUALLY UNDENIABLE TRUTHS. AS A NATION [redacted] SEES ARGENTINA AS LIVING IN A DREAM WORLD. EVERY INTERNATIONAL PRO-ARGENTINE PRESS ITEM RECEIVES FRONT PAGE NOTICES. ARTICLES OR OPINIONS TO THE CONTRARY ARE RESERVED FOR ONE OR TWO COLUMNS ON THE EDITORIAL PAGES. THE AVERAGE ARGENTINE SEES HIMSELF AS EXTREMELY RIGHTEOUS, UPRIGHT, AND KNOWLEDGEABLE IN MOST MATTERS. IN FACT THE DEPTH OF UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATIONS HERE IN ARGENTINA IS VERY SHALLOW INDEED. VIRTUALLY TO A MAN THE ARGENTINE MILITARY BELIEVE THEMSELVES TO BE THE PRIDE AND PROGENITOR OF AL. OF THE LATIN AMERICAN ARMED FORCES. THIS PERCEPTION HAS RECEIVED MUCH STROKING DURING AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT. ANY NEGATIVE INDICATIONS TO THIS PERCEPTION ARE QUICKLY FORGOTTEN OR PUSHED SO FAR ASIDE AS TO HAVE NO BEARING ON IT. SOLIDARITY OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IS THE BYWORD AND IN THE OPINION OF THE ARGENTINE THE LEADERSHIP IN THIS SOLIDARITY BELONGS TO THE ARGENTINE.

- B. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ IN ALL OF THIS THE ARGENTINE PERCEIVES THE UNITED STATES TO BE THEIR PRINCIPAL DETRACTOR. THE BELIEF IS VERY STRONG THAT FOR YEARS THE USG CULTIVATED ARGENTINA TO THE EVE OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT THEN ABANDONED THEM FOR THE BRITISH INTERESTS. WITH FIFTEEN BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 BUENOS AIRES AR

[redacted] ~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) [redacted]

COUNTRY: (U) ARGENTINA (AR) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: [redacted] COMMENTS ON ARGENTINA'S POL/

MONTHS TO CULTIVATE THESE BELIEFS SINCE THE CONFLICT, THE ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENTS ARE PRESENTLY VERY STRONG. WHEN THESE FEELINGS ARE FURTHER INCITED BY THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT OVER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, THE TERRIBLE OVERALL STATE OF THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY (ALSO PERCEIVED AS THE FAULT OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL POLICIES), AND THE BURDEN OF BEARING THE THIRD LARGEST EXTERNAL DEBT IN THE WORLD (WHICH MANY IN ARGENTINA BELIEVE IS OWED ONLY TO THE U.S.), IT IS NO WONDER THAT U.S./ARGENTINE RELATIONS ARE ON THE DOWN SLIDE. THE ARGENTINES, IN THEIR NAIVITY AND IN THEIR RIGHTEOUS PERCEPTION OF THEMSELVES, ARE CONVINCED THAT THEY NEED BUT TO STATE THEIR CASE AND RIGHT WILL WIN IN THE END. [redacted] MANY ARGENTINES WHO HAVE ACTUALLY RETURNED FROM VISITS TO THE U.S. CONVINCED TO THE CORE THAT THE USG/DOD ARE 100 PERCENT BEHIND THEIR OBJECTIVES. IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DESCRIBE HOW THESE PEOPLE IN GENERAL ARE ABLE TO SEE AND TO HEAR ONLY THAT WHICH SUITS THEIR OBJECTIVES AND NOT TO SEE OR NOT TO HEAR ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY.

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2. (U) HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE:

- A. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ IF THE INTENT OF THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE CURRENT MILITARY REGIME WAS ONLY TO RECTIFY THE IMMEDIATE AND APPARENT VIOLATIONS IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME IT WAS IMPOSED THEN [redacted]AN SAY WITH CONVICTION IT WAS SUCCESSFUL. HOWEVER, IF THERE WERE ANY UNDERLYING DESIRES TO EDUCATE THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE THAT SUCH ACTIONS AS WERE USED CAN NOT NOR WILL NOT BE TOLERATED BY THE CIVILIZED WORLD COMMUNITY, THEN [redacted]AN ALSO SAY WITH CONVICTION THAT THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY LEGISLATION FELL FAR SHORT OF THE MARK. THE ARGENTINE POLITICIAN, ARGENTINE MILITARY, AND THE ARGENTINE MAN-ON-THE-STREET THINK (IN BY FAR THE GREATER MAJORITY) THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE ARMED FORCES IN 1975-78 WERE ESSENTIAL, EXPEDIENT, AND ULTIMATELY SUCCESSFUL. CONFRONTED WITH SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF CIVIL/INTERNAL DISORDER [redacted]S OF THE STRONG OPINION THE ARGENTINE WOULD

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NOT HESITATE TO REPEAT A "PROVEN" TACTIC REGARDLESS OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION. THIS IMPRESSION DOES NOT COME TO [redacted] FROM THE MILITARY ALONE BUT COLLECTIVELY FROM ALL WALKS OF ARGENTINE SOCIETY.

- B. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ WITH RESPECT TO USG ACTIONS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, THERE IS ANOTHER COMMON PERCEPTION HELD BY ANY IF NOT A MAJORITY OF THE ARGENTINES THAT THE USG IS TOTALLY LACKING IN UNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA OR THEY WOULD NOT BE TRYING TO "IMPOSE" FOREIGN IDEOLOGY IN THE FORM OF HUMAN RIGHTS EDICTS, MORES, AND MORALS. [redacted] [redacted]BY AND LARGE THE ARGENTINE HAS NO PROBLEM WITH EITHER DEFINITIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS OR INTERNATIONAL BASIS OR THE BASIC TENENTS ON WHICH THEY ARE FOUNDED. WHAT THEY DO HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH IS THEIR BEING SANCTIONED BY THE U.S. AND ONLY THE U.S. THEY SEE THESE POLICIES AS BEING VERY UNEVENLY ENFORCED AND HAVE THE CONCEPTION THAT THE HEAVIEST HAND FELL ON ARGENTINA. [redacted] FEELS THAT THE ARGENTINE RESENTS MUCH MORE THE IMPOSITION OF THE ACT THAN ANY REAL LOSSES THAT RESULTED FROM ITS IMPOSITION.

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- C. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THREE POINTS IN SUPPORT OF [redacted] OPINION FOLLOWS: (1) THE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO HERE IN ARGENTINA HAVE VIRTUALLY NO INFLUENCE, AND THE MAJORITY OF THEIR SUPPORT IS FROM OUTSIDE OF ARGENTINA. THE AVERAGE ARGENTINE SHOWS VERY LITTLE INTEREST IN THEIR CAUSE. (2) THIS GOVERNMENT RECENTLY PASSED THE AMNESTY LAW COVERING THE ACTIONS OF THE PERIOD 1973-82 AND ALTHOUGH THERE ARE RUMBLINGS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY FROM SOME POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CIRCLES, THERE IS STRONG CONCENSUS THAT THE LAW AS PROMULGATED WILL PROVE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN ITS INTENDED PURPOSE WHICH IS TO SHIELD THOSE WHO CARRIED OUT THE ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIONS OF THE STATE DURING THIS PERIOD. (3) ON THE HEELS OF THE AMNESTY LAW CAME A SECOND LAW, THE ANTI-TERRORIST LAW. THIS LAW IS MEETING MORE BY

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 BUENOS AIRES AR

[redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) [redacted]

COUNTRY: (U) ARGENTINA (AR) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: [redacted] COMMENTS ON ARGENTINA'S POL/

OPPOSITION, BUT IT COMES DURING A PERIOD OF POLITICAL MANEOUVERING AND CAMPAIGNS. THIS LAW IN EFFECT SANCTIONS A SOMEWHAT "WATERED DOWN" VERSION OF THE LAW FOR DENIAL OF THOSE HUMAN LIBERTIES AND FREEDOMS WHICH WERE EVIDENT DURING THE "TERRORIST" ERA. [redacted] THIS LAW PROBABLY WILL NOT SURVIVE DURING A CIVILIAN REGIME BUT IN ITS PLACE WILL BE A COMPROMISE PIECE OF LEGISLATION PROVIDING FOR AN EMERGENCY ACTION SCENARIO WHEN AND IF DECLARED WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY INCORPORATE THE BASICS OF THE CURRENT LEGISLATION.

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3. (U) POLITICAL DRUTHERS OF THE CURRENT MILITARY REGIME:

- A. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ ONE CAN VIRTUALLY ADD ANOTHER POLITICAL SCENARIO TO THE ENORMOUS VOLUME OF SCENARIOS ON HAND BY SIMPLY ASKING ONE MORE PERSON FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT. AS ASSIMILATED [redacted] THE CONCENSUS OPINION IS THAT THE MILITARY IN GENERAL WANT THE PERONIST FACTIONS TO WIN THE ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH [redacted] KNOWS PERSONALLY SOME VERY SENIOR OFFICIALS WHO ARE STRONG SUPPORTERS OF THE RADICALS, THE MAJORITY BELIEVE THAT ONLY THE PERONISTS, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE MILITARY, WILL HAVE EVEN THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE OF SURVIVING A SIX-YEAR TERM. THIS SAME MAJORITY VARIES ON THE AMOUNT OF TIME AN ELECTED ALFONSINISTA (RADICAL PARTY) GOVERNMENT COULD SURVIVE WITHOUT SUPPORT OF LABOR AND MILITARY FROM ONE DAY TO A MAXIMUM OF ONE YEAR. THE TERM OF AN ALFONSIN DIRECTED GOVERNMENT IS VIEWED AS A SHORT ROAD TO PERDITION.

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- B. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ IN THE OPINION [redacted] ARGENTINA DOES NOT HAVE ANOTHER POWER BASE OF SUFFICIENT DIRECTION OR POWER TO CONTROL THE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY OTHER THAN THE MILITARY/FEDERAL POLICE. THE LABOR MOVEMENT IS STRONG BUT LACKS SUFFICIENT ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP. CONSIDERING THE CURRENT ENORMOUS CONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING ANY ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE LACK OF MOTIVATION OR CONVICTION OF THE POPULACE, AND THE HISTORICAL PENCHANT OF ARGENTINA FOR REACTING TO DISSATIS-

FACTION BY MILITARY COUP, PERHAPS NEITHER THE PERONISTS NOR THE RADICALS WILL SUCCEED. [redacted] AMONG MILITARY CONTACTS THE FOLLOWING SINCERE AND GENUINE DESIRES:

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- TO PROFESSIONALIZE THEIR SERVICES.
- TO DE-POLITICIZE THE SERVICES.
- TO ASSIST AT GREAT DEPRIVATIONS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES IN CORRECTING CURRENT ECONOMIC WOES.
- TO SEE THE ULTIMATE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRY.
- TO SUCCESSFULLY DEVELOP THE COUNTRY TO ITS NATURAL POTENTIAL.

- C. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ IN GENERAL THERE IS THE FEELING EXPRESSED BY MANY THAT THERE IS A DESIRE TO SEE ARGENTINA TAKE ITS "PLACE IN THE SUN."

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- D. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ ALL OF THE ABOVE SOUNDS LIKE VERY WORTHY GOALS BUT [redacted] THEY ARE MADE WITHOUT THE NECESSARY CONVICTION THAT THEY CAN BE ACHEIVED. IN DISCUSSIONS [redacted] THE MOST COMMON ATTITUDE EXPRESSED BY ARGENTINES TO QUESTIONS OF A PROGNOSTIC NATURE IS VERY NEGATIVE AND PESSIMISTIC. A TYPICAL IF NOT THE MOST FREQUENTLY HEARD IS THAT THEY FEEL AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT (PERONIST) WILL HAVE A BRIEF PERIOD OF SUCCESS AFTER THEY COME TO POWER BUT SHORTLY, 4 TO 6 MONTHS, THE OLD WAYS OF THE PARTY WILL BEGIN TO TAKE OVER THEN AFTER A YEAR TO 18 MONTHS OF MISMANAGEMENT THE MILITARY OR SOME OTHER FACTION WILL STEP IN AND TAKE CONTROL ONCE AGAIN.

4. (U) INTER-SERVICE REVALRIES. BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 BUENOS AIRES AR [redacted]

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SERIAL: (U) [redacted]

COUNTRY: (U) ARGENTINA (AR)

SUBJ: [redacted] COMMENTS ON ARGENTINA'S POL-

A. ~~C/NOFORN~~ AS ELECTIONS DRAW CLOSER THE VACILATIONS OF THE SERVICES SEEMS TO BE SETTLING INTO TWO CAMPS "THE ARMY AND NAVY IN ONE AND THE AIR FORCE MOVING TO THE RIGHT WITH HARDLINE RHETORIC. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR ARGNAV OFFICIALS [redacted] "THE ARMY AND NAVY ARE GOING TO PUSH FOR THE ELECTIONS TO COMPLETION AND SURVIVE WITH WHAT EVER OUTCOME RESULTS." WHEN ASKED [redacted] "WHAT ABOUT THE AIR FORCE?" THE RESPONSE WAS THAT THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE IS ALWAYS IN OPPOSITION

B. ~~C/NOFORN~~ BECAUSE THE AIR FORCE HERE IN ARGENTINA HAS DEVELOPED AN ATTITUDE OF SUPERIORITY BASED ON THEIR PERCEIVED SUCCESSES DURING THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT. IT IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE APPARENT THAT [redacted] IN THE AIR FORCE] ARE SPOUTING MUCH MORE THE "RIGHTIST" POSITION [redacted] IN CURRENT POLICY THAT WHILE THE AIR FORCE HIERARCHY MAY NOT BE TOTALLY IN FAVOR OF DEFAULTING ON THE EXTERNAL DEBT THEY ARE TAKING THE HARD LINE AGAINST THE REST OF THE JUNTA OVER THE DEBT RESCHEDULING, THAT THE AIR FORCE IS MUCH MORE ANTI-U.S. IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE MEDIA AND EMBASSY PERSONNEL, THAT THE AIR FORCE HEIRARCHY ALONG WITH THE OTHER SERVICES IS IN GENERAL UNSATISFIED WITH THE PROSPECTS OF AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT. IT COULD BE SIMPLY A MATTER OF JOCKEYING FOR POSITION SUCH THAT IF WORST DOES COME TO WORST THEN THEY WILL BE IN A POSITION TO BE ABLE TO SAY "I TOLD YOU SO." SHOULD THERE BE ANY SIGNIFICANT CIVIL DISORDER OR MAJOR PROBLEMS ARISE IN THE INTERIM OF ELECTIONS TO THE ASSUMPTION OF CONTROL OF AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT THE AIR FORCE COULD THEN POSSIBLY IMPROVE ITS POSITION FROM THE "THIRD SERVICE."

C. ~~C/NOFORN~~ [redacted] STILL THE POWER OF THE JUNTA LIES WITH THE ARMY AND IN REALITY THE ARMY CONTROLS 51 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN ANY DECISION. BY THE END OF THIS YEAR WHEN THE CURRENT HIERARCHIES ARE SHUFFLED AND MANY OF THE CURRENT POLICY MAKERS ARE RETIRED THE BALANCE COULD SHIFT TOWARD THE RIGHT, HARD-LINE, NATIONALISTS SHOULD PROBLEMS ARISE IF THE POST ELECTION PERIOD IS ORDERLY

AND QUIET. [redacted] THE MODERATES WILL MOVE UP TO TAKE CONTROL AND A MORE SANE ATTITUDE WILL RESULT IN THE SERVICES

5. ~~C/NOFORN~~ ARE THE RUSSIANS REALLY COMING? [redacted] OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF THAT FROM ALL FRONTS HE HAS BEEN HEARING FROM ARGENTINE MILITARY THAT "THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING"--PARTICULARILY IF THE USG DOES NOT AIDE ARGENTINA IN SOME GOAL SUCH AS REGAINING THE MALVINAS ISLANDS, STOPPING THE BRITISH FROM BUILDING THE FORTRESS FALKLANDS OR CERTIFYING ARGENTINA FOR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGAIN. BASICALLY [redacted] THE IMPRESSION THAT ALL OF THIS WAS AND IS JUST TALK IN ORDER TO SOMEHOW INFLUENCE THE USG TO ACT ALONG THE LINES OF THE DESIRES OF THE ARGENTINE REGIME [redacted] THAT ALTHOUGH IN GENERAL "HE ARGENTINE IS VERY ANTI-SOVIET AND VERY ANTI-COMMUNIST. IN MOST CIRCLES, THAT SHOULD THINGS START TO GO BAD HERE AFTER THE ELECTIONS FOR THE POPULACE IN GENERAL THAT THE RECEPTIVENESS TO SOVIET INGRESS WOULD WARM UP CONSIDERABLY. INITIALLY IN THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE THE RUSSIANS COULD EASILY BARGAIN WITH A WEAK AND FLOUNDERING ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE THE BALANCE OF TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS COULD THEN GIVE THE RUSSIANS MORE THAN A "FOOT IN THE DOOR." HERE THE MILITARY HAS EXPRESSED A REAL CONCERN THAT IF IN ORDER TO SELL THEIR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS TO THE SOVIETS IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE IN PAYMENT IN COMMODITIES AND TECHNOLOGY FROM THE SOVIETS THAT AN "ALREADY LEFTIST LEANING GOVERNMENT" MIGHT STRIKE BARGAINS TO TEMPORARILY SOLVE SOME OF THIS COUNTRIES GRAVE ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS. HARDLINERS IN THE ANTI-SOVIET CAMP TELL [redacted] THIS IS ONE THING THE MILITARY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT AND THEY FEEL CERTAIN THEY WOULD SEE A MILITARY COUP OR SIGNIFICANT AND POSSIBLY VIOLENT OPPOSITION SHOULD THERE BE A MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION [redacted] WHILE THIS IS NOT A MAJOR FACTOR AT PRESENT IT SHOULD BE MONITORED CLOSELY BY

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 BUENOS AIRES AR [redacted]

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN (b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) [redacted]

COUNTRY: (U) ARGENTINA (AR) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: [redacted] COMMENTS ON ARGENTINA'S FOL/

IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF A NEWLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT.

Sec. 3.3 (b) (1)

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

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1. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ PROGNOSIS IN OPINION OF [redacted] FOR THE SHORT TERM [redacted] AFTER LIVING IN ARGENTINA SOME 28 MONTHS [redacted] ELECTIONS WILL MOST PROBABLY BE HELD ON SCHEDULE. THE PERONISTS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY WIN THE ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE AT LEAST A DOZEN RUMORS OF GREAT RIFTS AND CHANGES IN STORE FOR ALL OF THE ARMED FORCES, [redacted] THERE WILL BE A MINIMAL CHANGE IN THE SERVICES FOR THE SHORT TERM. BUSINESS WILL GO ON MUCH AS BEFORE WITH SOME "WINDOW DRESSING" INEFFECTIVE CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE. THE PERONISTS WILL ULTIMATELY RESPECT THE AMNESTY LAW AND SANCTION AT LEAST SOME PORTIONS OF THE ANTI-TERRORIST LAW CURRENTLY ON THE BOOKS. THE MILITARY WILL RETURN TO THE BARRACKS IN PRINCIPAL BUT WILL MAINTAIN A VERY CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE DIALOG WITH THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT. THE MILITARY WILL OF NECESSITY OPERATE ON A MORE FRUGAL BUDGET AND BE MUCH LESS VISIBLE IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS. [redacted] THEY WILL HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO BE THE POWER BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT AND EXERCISE THEIR CONTACTS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH LOW PROFILE. IN THIS MANNER SO SHELTERED THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN A POSITION TO STEP IN WHEN CALLED OR WHEN THEY DEEM IT NECESSARY. THIS COULD BE THE CASE FOR ABOUT TWO YEARS. SHOULD THE FUNCTIONING OF THIS GOVERNMENT HAVE EVEN LIMITED SUCCESS THEY COULD EXPAND THE DEMOCRATIC POWER STRUCTURE UNDER THE WATCHFUL EYES OF THE MILITARY TO A POINT OF SOME AUTONOMY. THE MOST DELICATE PERIOD OF TRANSITION WILL COME IN THE FIRST 9-12 MONTHS. IF THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT SURVIVES 2 YEARS [redacted] IT HAS A CHANCE TO SURVIVE THE FULL TERM.

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

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CHARGE COMMENT: (C/NOFORN) ARGENTINE VIEWS AND ACTIONS ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY, ARE VOLATILE DURING THIS PERIOD OF CHANGE IN THE AFTERMATH OF A LOSING WAR. HOWEVER, FOR PERHAPS THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY BOTH MAJOR POLITICAL

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ACTION DB-3E1(*) (I,M)
INFO NIDS(*) J3-NMCC(*) J5(*) SECDEF(*) USDP(**)
ASD:PA&E(*) DI-1(*) NMIC(*) RTS-2B(1) NWS(*)
JS1-4B(*) DC-4(*) AT(*) AT-X(*) AIS(*) DIO(*) DE(*)
DE-4(*) DB-3E(*) DB-4(*) DB-4F2(*) DB-5D2(*)
DB-1E(*) DT-1(*) DIA(*) DT-5(*)
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PARTIES ARE CAMPAIGNING ON A PLATFORM OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. STABILITY WILL BE DIFFICUT FOR ARGENTINES TO ACHIEVE, BUT U.S. INTERESTS CAN BE WELL SERVED BY WORKING CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH BOTH THE ELECTED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE IMPORTANT MILITARY INSTITUTION WITHOUT ALLOWING THE UPS AND DOWNS OF ARGENTINE RHETORIC TO DRIVE U.S. POLICY.
PROJ: (U) N/A
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR:
PREP:
APPR:
EVAL: (U) NO, REL TO: NONE
ENCL: (U) N/A
DISSEM: (U) [redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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